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Judicial Conservatives and the Supreme Courtt
Ronald R. Davenport*
I was given the title "Judicial Conservatives and the Supreme
Court." I think that is a rather appropriate title in that we must draw
a distinction between judicial conservatives and the Supreme Court,
judicial conservatives on the Supreme Court, and conservatives on the
Supreme Court. DeToqueville said that every question in the United
States sooner or later is framed as a legal question and comes before
the Supreme Court. I think that speaks something of the Court's
power and its influence in our society. Frankfurter has said that the
Supreme Court's power is neither of the purse nor of the sword, but
moral suasion. Now what does that mean? It means that the Supreme
Court does not have an army or navy and cannot collect taxes. It means,
therefore, that the Supreme Court must enjoy the confidence not only
of its citizenry, but the confidence of its co-equal branches of government. The Court relies on the Congress to finance it; it relies on the
executive to enforce its judgment. To the extent it reflects the tacit
understanding that exists between the competing forces of a free
society-that is, the tacit understanding between the executive, legislature, and judiciary-it can be effective. To the extent it fails to reflect
this tacit understanding, to the extent it operates as a power independent, it runs into the danger of severely compromising its position in
our society.
In the past, particularly under Chief Justice Warren, we have heard
the terms "judicial activist" and "judicial conservative." The question
is what do those words mean? Normally when you think of a conservative, you think of one who is slow to move, or who believes that we
should be very careful of how we move. When you think of an activist,
you think about action, about striking out and reaching to new areas
and new places of concern.
Under the Warren Court, judicial activists have been generally regarded as being liberal in protecting the rights of minorities, the rights
of accused criminals, and the rights of persons who are attempting to
t This article is based on excerpts from a speech delivered by Ronald R. Davenport
to the members of the Musmanno Chapter of Delta Theta Phi Fraternity and the law
school community on November 9, 1971. Ronald R. Davenport is Dean of the Duquesne
University School of Law.
* B.S. Pennsylvania State University; LL.B. Temple University; LL.M. Yale University.
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exercise their constitutional rights under the first amendment. Judicial
conservatives, on the other hand, have been thought of as urging a
kind of go-slow attitude in opposition to the protection of rights of
the accused criminals, more concerned about protecting society from
pressures which are tearing it apart: more concerned about those individuals who challenge society and abuse it; timid in their approach
to the Court's relationship to the other branches of government; deferential to the legislature, to the executive; deferential to the rights of
the individual states to experiment with their own forms of government. In general, judicial conservatism has been painted as a kind of
recognition of the limited nature of the Supreme Court's function in
our society. A Court that recognizes that the Congress legislates and
the executive enforces the law is one that acts merely to serve as a
check in the check and balance system. In short, judicial conservatives
see the Court as a check against the possible abuses of congressional or
executive power.
I think the terms "judicial activist" and "judicial conservative" are
misused. Is it really conservative to say that the Court has the right to
pick and choose those aspects of the constitution which it will, in its
discretion, apply to the state? Is it liberal, on the other hand, to say
that a constitution was meant to protect individual rights within the
states? Is it liberal to say that the natural law philosophy of picking and
choosing among consitutional rights which are to be applied to the
states is a bad philosophy and aggrandizes unto the Court more power
than the constitution intended? Is it liberal to say that the federal constitution should mean the same in the federal court as it means in the
state court? Or that the federal standard, in terms of the interpretation
of a right, should be as applicable in the state court as it is in the
federal court? Is it conservative to say that the constitution can mean
something else in the state court than it means in the federal court?
That in fact the individual states are free to experiment with the rights
of individual citizens?
I think that a persuasive case can be made that in fact the so-called
"judicial activists" really view the Supreme Court's power, its role
vis-a-vis other branches of government, in a limited way. The activists
would have the constitution serve to define that role, whereas those who
have been referred to as "judicial conservatives" would give to the
Court the power under its own volition to determine that role independent of what the constitution says. In terms of the Supreme Court's
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power vis-a-vis its coordinate branches of government then, the "judicial activist" can really be called conservative and the "judicial conservative" can really be called liberal.
As some of you may know, recently I was approached by the judiciary
committee of the American Bar Association and asked what kind of
criteria it should use in making a determination of competence for the
Supreme Court. This procedure came about as a result of the decision
by Attorney General Mitchell to avoid the stresses and strains of nomination fights that surrounded Carswell and Haynesworth. The procedure has been greatly criticized by those who maintain the
constitution says nothing about obtaining the approval of the American
Bar Association in choosing Supreme Court Justices. In addition, the
procedure has been criticized by some groups in labor and in the civil
rights movement who say the American Bar Association committee is
not reflective of the Bar as a whole; that it is corporate and establishment in character.
In the past, the President has made nominations to the Supreme
Court and the ABA has passed on those nominations only after the
names were made public. Of course, the ABA committee vote would
be "qualified" or "supremely qualified" or words to that effect. The
practical purpose behind the Attorney General's use of the pre-screening device of the ABA Judiciary Committee was to save the administration from embarassment in discovering the Committee's opinion after
the nominations had been made public. In one sense, such a strategy
makes a great deal of sense. First, and most obviously, one obtains prior
approval, so to speak, of those persons, and one has a public and private
indication of the Bar's evaluation of their competence to serve on the
Supreme Court. I would also assume that the procedure has some
political benefit, in that the names of individuals under consideration
would be made public, and any skeletons in the closets of the nominees
would probably manifest themselves before a formal nomination was
made.
On the other hand, there is the question to what extent the President
should defer to the judgment of the American Bar Association's Judiciary Committee, a highly selective group, which can be legitimately
criticized as not being representative of the various currents of Bar
opinion. In addition, the procedure seems grossly unfair to the potential nominees, given the controversy that has surrounded the most
recent Supreme Court nominations. A nominee can look forward to his
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entire background being microscoped by high school students, law
students, members of the ABA Judiciary Committee, members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, newspaper reporters, and the press, both
nationally and in his particular community. Every aspect of his life is
held up to a microscope-as well it should be.
It seems unfair that a man who subsequently is not nominated has
to undergo this kind of pressure and inspection, with statements being
made about his competence or lack of it-repeated references to every
mistake which he may or may not have made in the past, every speech,
every article that he has ever written, every friend that he has ever had.
It seems unfair that a man should have to undergo this kind of exposure, this kind of public inspection without the attendant benefit of
an actual nomination.
On balance, I believe the Attorney General's decision not to have a
prior screening of the nominee before the ABA's Judiciary Committee
is a wise one. The Attorney General's ostensible basis for this decision
is the fact that the names were subsequently made public. I think that
is not the best reason for his decision. I am confident that the Justice
Department anticipated the names would be made public and the
investigation would not be conducted in secrecy. Nevertheless, I think
it is a wise decision to eliminate prior screening because it has the
effect of protecting the integrity of the Presidency, the integrity of the
potential nominee, and the integrity of the ABA Judiciary Committee.
In response to the question of what the ABA's Judiciary Committee
should look for in making the determination whether or not a man is
competent or qualified to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court, I suggested
the following: first, the man or woman must have intellectual competence-by that I mean the ability to deal in an understanding way with
complex legal questions which come before the Court; the ability not
only to understand the legal question as it is framed, but also to understand the impact of a decision one way or the other on the law. In
short, he should understand what a particular decision is likely to lead
to in the future.
Secondly, I suggested that a man must be personally honest. By
honesty I mean that he should have a mind open to new ideas or new
ways of looking at old ideas. It does not mean freedom from ideas or
freedom from prejudices. All of us have our own prejudices and
preferences. Hopefully, none of us are free from ideas-we have areas
of concerns and experiences and these are important. But the question
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is to what extent do we maintain open minds? To what extent do we
hear people who march to the tune of a different drummer? To what
extent do we maintain an open mind to understand the problem as
perceived by other people? To what extent can we listen and can we
learn? It is unnecessary that we agree with those people who disagree
with us. But it is necessary that we understand what concerns them,
and it occurs to me, therefore, that personal honesty, is absolutely
essential for a Supreme Court justice.
In defense of this particular criteria, I pointed out to the inquirer,
that it did not really matter whether or not a man were a liberal or a
conservative. In my judgment, that is an irrelevant question. It is
likely, of course, that a liberal president is going to appoint liberals to
the Court, and a conservative president is likely to appoint conservatives to the Court, but that is not the question.
To make my point, I use as an example Mr. Justice Harlan. Mr.
Justice Harlan is the Wall Street lawyer, the same man whose grandfather served on the Supreme Court. He was patrician in his background and patrician in his bearing. On those complex questions

affecting our society, his philosophy had a decidedly conservative bent.
Yet, despite that, Mr. Justice Harlan was a respected and greatly admired Supreme Court justice because of his honesty.
Mr. Justice Harlan, even when he dissented in a particular opinion,
would accept that opinion, if it commanded a majority of the Court
as being the law of the land. His recent opinion in Cohen v. California,'
I think, is an excellent example of his ability to distinguish between
personal feelings and the question of whether or not the activity engaged in by an individual was constitutionally protected. In that case,
Cohen was accused of violating the California breach of the peace statute for wearing an expletive on his jacket in a Los Angeles courthouse
corridor where women and children were present. In reversing Mr.
Cohen's conviction, Mr. Justice Harlan said in part:
Surely the state has no right to cleanse the public debate to the
point where it is grammaticially palatable to the most squeamish
among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for
stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment
alone. For, while the particular four letter word being litigated
here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it
I.
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is nevertheless
often true that one man's vulgarity is another's
2
lyric.
I think Mr. Justice Harlan's honesty and integrity can also be amply
demonstrated by a careful examination of his opinions in the area of
criminal rights, first amendment rights, or in the area of governmental
power. From a reading of these cases it becomes clear that his mind
was always open to new ideas and that he always listened.
As a third criteria I suggested that a man serving on the Supreme
Court must have some understanding of the complex forces at work in
our society. More particularly, he must appreciate the pressures and
strains on our society, put forward by management, by unions, by
students, by blacks, by poor whites, by the disaffected, and by those
people who feel that society is too permissive. In short, one might say,
by all competing forces that are now at work. By understanding I do
not necessarily mean agreement, nor do I assume that because a man
was a corporate lawyer or a civil rights lawyer that he will be unable
to make unbiased judgments on a particular question presented to the
Court.
A justice should have an appreciation for the alienation that some
people feel-the insecurity that is felt by others. Toffler in his book
Future Shock3 has written that we live in a time where change is constant, where principles and ideals that once were immutable are now
disposable-what was current today is pass6 tomorrow. This makes life
difficult and quite often confusing. Those of us who were educated
primarily in the 1950's are beset by the children of television of the
1960's and the 1970's and we don't really understand. We are more
comfortable in the days of the button-down shirts and the crewcut
and the football heroes on Saturday afternoons. We neither understand
nor appreciate the alienation felt by young people, or the insecurity
felt by ethnic communities. We see persons marching in an anti-Vietnam demonstration protesting the war, we see them marching peacefully in three button suits. We see in the same crowd long haired
hippies marching under a Vietcong flag and we become confused. We
lump those persons who are genuinely concerned with the problem of
the war with those who use the war as an excuse to engage in excesses.
It occurs to me that you can be concerned about the war without
giving comfort to the North Vietnamese.
2.

Id. at 25.

S.

TOFFLER, FTumRE SHOCK

(1971).

173

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 10: 168, 1971

We must-that is those persons who hold positions of responsibility,
particularly the courts--draw a distinction between those who are concerned, and those who use the concerns of the American society to act
out their own frustrations. I believe that Justice Harlan exhibited this
kind of sensitivity on the Court. Again to return to his opinion in
Cohen,4 he distinguishes between the emotional nature of the word
used (or rather painted on) Cohen's jacket and the likely response of
passers-by. (I would add here parenthetically that Mr. Justices Burger
and Blackman both dissented on the ground that Mr. Cohen's actions
constituted not speech but conduct and could therefore be punished
under California criminal laws.) Reasonable men can and will differ in
a democratic society, and its strength is that they do differ. But the
measure of any society is not how it treats those persons whom it
admires, but how it treats those whom it despises. The test of any
democratic system is not how it treats those who sing its praises, but
those who criticize. It is not how it responds to its heroes, but how it
treats its enemies.
Finally, in response to the ABA inquiry, I said that to be on the
Supreme Court it is not necessary that one be a lawyer. I believe it was
Mr. Justice Black who said that a thoughtful, disciplined philosopher
who understood the problems of our society could function effectively
on the Court. The Court is more than just a place where laws are
interpreted or administered. It is a place where clearly a man strongly
grounded in philosophy or political science could add to and give
insight into the policy questions the Court confronts.
The Supreme Court, to be effective in my view, must stand as a
bastion against popular passion. In the past, the Supreme Court has at
times failed to do this. It failed, for example, when the Japanese were
placed in relocation centers during the Second World War. It failed
when men were being attacked and pilloried for being associated with
allegedly communist causes, or accused of being communist and had
their constitutional rights abrogated by the Smith Act. But when it
truly performs its highest function, when it truly works in our society,
as I have said before, it serves to protect the friendless.
The Congress stands for re-election every two or six years and therefore will reflect almost immediately the popular passions of our time.
The executive branch of government stands for re-election through
the President every four years and, therefore, will also reflect popular
4.
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passions. The Supreme Court, however, is appointed for life. It can,
when it is effective, serve as a protection against hasty reaction to a
particular problem. It can serve to give to society what Professor Bickel
of Yale has referred to as "the sober second thought." It can serve as
a leader who must both lead and educate. The Court has a responsibility
to be the conscience of this country. While it should be aware of popular passion and cross-currents in our society, it should not necessarily
be swayed by them. We need individuals on the Court who not only
have the intellectual competence and personal honesty but open mindedness, and the ability to listen and to learn. No man on the Court
should attempt to make the constitution mean what he thinks it
should mean. No man on the Court should be in the position to engraft
his socio-economic or political philosophy on the populace at large.
Whether we are Democrats or Republicans, corporation lawyers or
civil rights lawyers, lawyers for the establishment or lawyers against the
establishment will be clearly reflected in how we perceive problems
and that is to be expected. However, a distinction should be drawn
between the person who is influenced by his background and one who
is dominated by that background.
The Supreme Court is a unique institution. It is probably the most
influential and powerful court in the entire western civilization. It has
so existed because of the confidence it maintains with the people. It
can only maintain that confidence as long as it recognizes its role both
to lead and to educate. The Court must reflect, yet provide insight into
the needs and aspirations of the people. Professor Bickel in his book,
The Least Dangerous Branch, said the following:
If what is meant is that the Court is restricted to deciding an existing national consensus; that it is to enforce as law only the most
widely shared values ... this would charge the Court with a function to which it is, of all our institutions, least suited. Surely the
political institutions are more fitted than the Court to find and
express an existing consensus .... The Court is a leader of opinion
not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not merely
impose its own; and-the short of it is-it labors under the
obligation to succeed. 5
President Nixon has had a unique opportunity to nominate four
men for the court. That a moderate-to-conservative President should
attempt to nominate moderate-to-conservative men is not surprising.
5.
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In fact, it is probably desirable. The point about which lawyers and
citizens alike can be concerned is the placing on the court not men of
moderation, but men who would radically change the direction and
focus of the court-men who would hold back from protecting the
rights of individual citizens, even the most despicable. It may rightfully
fear men who under the guise of conservatism would attempt to engraft their economic, political, or social philosophy on the populace at
large. Men who, on the one hand, would understate the Supreme
Court's role by giving undue deference to the executive, to the legislature, and would, on the other hand, overstate the Supreme Court's
role by attempting to redraft the constitution to reflect their views.
This is a danger which the Court now faces. This is the opportunity
that the President now has.
On the one hand, he may appoint a moderate-to-conservative man
who will not strike out in new directions. On the other hand, he may
appoint an.aggressive, allegedly conservative man, who perhaps is more
reactionary than conservative--one who would use the constitution as
a shield for the activities of the zealot, the excessive patriot, the indifference of a government official, the overaggressiveness of the police
-and call them lawful. A Court so dominated, a Court so reflective, a
Court so aggressive can reap untold problems for the future.

176

